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The Appellees, Jane Harper, Richard D. Harper, Frank Cattelan, 
Richard Richins and the Dicker Hill Trust (hereinafter referred to 
collectively as "Appellees"), each Plaintiffs below, submit this 
Reply Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
ORDERING REMOVAL OF THE UTELITE FACILITY 
Appellants Summit County and Utelite argue that the Utelite 
facility is an "accessory to a non-conforming use" in an attempt to 
overturn summary judgment for two reasons: (1) to avoid the 
undisputed facts demonstrating that the County Planning Commission 
illegally allowed the Utelite aggregate loading facility as a 
"permitted use" in a rural residential zone1; and (2) to create a 
fact dispute as to whether the loading facility is an "accessory 
use" to a non-conforming use. This argument is nothing more than 
post hoc justification for the improper siting of the Utelite 
facility. 
The record is clear. The County Planning Commission 
classified the facility as a "permitted use." The first time that 
it was suggested that the facility was an "accessory to a non-
conforming use" occurred after the facility had been built, and it 
was by the Assistant County Attorney. This "after-the-fact" 
1
 The Development Code explicitly lists the uses allowed in a 
rural residential zone, and a commercial loading facility is not 
included. Development Code § 12.20; see Appellee's Opening Brief 
at 22. 
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classification had nothing to do with the decision allowing Utelite 
to locate its facility. 
Moreover, the classification was wrong. There cannot be an 
"accessory to a nonconforming use." The Summit County Development 
Code2 does not authorize or even mention uses accessory to 
nonconforming uses and cannot be interpreted to allow a 
nonconforming use to be expanded as an accessory. Specifically, 
the Development Code states: 
The nonconforming use of land, existing at the time this 
Code became effective, may be continued, provided that no 
such nonconforming use of land shall in any way be 
expanded or extended either on the same or adjoining 
property, and provided that if such nonconforming use of 
land, or any portion thereof, is abandoned or changed for 
a period of one (1) year or more, any future use of such 
land shall be in conformity with the provisions of this 
Code. 
Development Code § 3.7 (emphasis added) . Even if Appellants claim 
that the Railroad is a nonconforming use, the Code expressly 
prohibits the expansion that Appellants advocate. 
Furthermore, the common law of zoning does not authorize the 
expansion of a nonconforming use by claiming it is an accessory.3 
The Idaho Supreme Court, for example, in County of Ada v. Schemm, 
529 P.2d 1268 (Idaho 1974), applied a zoning law nearly identical 
to Summit County's to hold that one could not maintain a new 
2
 Although Appellants never cite to it in their brief, 
Appellees implore the Court to carefully review Chapter 3 of the 
Development Code. See Addendum A. 3 to Appellees' Opening Brief. 
3
 Appellants have been unable to identify a Utah case 
examining zoning provisions like those in this case. 
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building as an "accessory" to an existing nonconforming structure.4 
Schemm at 1270. The Schemm Court stated: 
even if appellants' argument that the structure is an 
accessory use be accepted (respondent-County argues 
vehemently to the contrary) nevertheless such accessory 
use to a nonconforming use is not authorized and is 
prohibited by the zoning ordinance. Such interpretation 
comports with the general concept of zoning policy that 
nonconforming uses should not be allowed to expand and 
eventually should be eliminated. 
Schemm at 1270 (citing O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 202 P.2d 401 
(Idaho 194 9); Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of 
Boise, 468 P.2d 290 (1970); 1 R.M. Anderson, American Law of 
Zoning, § 6.07). It is a basic concept that: 
[b]ecause non-conforming uses and structures, so long as 
they exist, prevent full realization of the zoning plan, 
the spirit of zoning is, and has been, to restrict, 
rather than increase, such non-conformities and to 
eliminate such uses as speedily as possible. 
2 A. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, 62-1 (3d Ed.).5 
4
 The definitions for "nonconforming use" and "accessory" in 
the ordinance at issue in the Schemm case are similar to those in 
the Summit County Development Code. According to the Schemm 
ordinance, a nonconforming use is: 
A building, structure or premises legally existing and/or 
used at the time of adoption of this Ordinance, or any 
amendment thereto, and which does not conform with the 
use regulations of the district in which located. 
Ada County Zoning Ordinance § 2.086 as quoted in Schemm at 1269. 
Compare with Summit County Development Code §§ 1-6(51), (52). An 
accessory use is defined as: 
A use or structure subordinate to the principal use on 
the same lot and serving a purpose customarily incidental 
to the use or the principal building. 
Ada County Zoning Ordinance § 2.002 as quoted in Schemm at 1269. 
Compare with Summit County Development Code § 1-6(63). 
5
 Further, the addition of new facilities would most likely be 
regarded as an extension of use if the nonconforming use is thereby 
rendered more incompatible with permitted uses, if the volume or 
g:\jlw\echo\brief.a21 3 
Appellants stretch to avoid Summit County's Development Code 
and these well-accepted principles arguing that the loading 
facility could be located at any point along the railroad right-of-
way because "the entire tract is generally regarded as within the 
exemption of an existing nonconforming use, although the entire 
tract is not so used at the time of the passage or effective date 
of the zoning ordinance."6 Appellants' Reply Brief at 4. This 
statement directly contradicts section 3.7 of the Development Code, 
which provides that "no such nonconforming use of land shall in any 
way be expanded or extended either on the same or adjoining 
property." Development Code § 3.7 (emphasis added). 
Appellants also attempt to circumvent the Development Code in 
their argument regarding the necessity of a building permit. They 
assert that a fact issue existed due to an affidavit, prepared by 
the County Attorney, from a building inspector that claimed the 
loading "apparatus" originally installed was an "accessory 
intensity of use is increased, or if the nature of the use is 
substantially changed. 83 Am Jur 2d Zoning and Planning § 664 
(citing Paramount Rock Co. v. County of San Diego, 4 Cal. Rptr. 317 
(where a rock crusher was installed at a nonconforming sand pit); 
County of San Diego v. McClurken, 234 P. 2d 972 (where storage tanks 
were replaced with tanks double the size); State v. Perry, 178 A. 2d 
279 (where a use was changed from an ice-cream company to a cold 
storage facility). 
6
 Appellants cite Gibbons & Reed v. North Salt Lake City, 431 
P. 2d 559, 564 (Utah 1967) . However, Gibbons did not address a 
zoning ordinance like the one in this case. Further, the Gibbons 
case is clearly distinguishable because it involved a narrow 
exception to the nonconforming use of extracting gravel -- a 
"diminishing asset." This narrow doctrine has never been applied 
to a case like this one. 
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building," and as such was exempt from building permit 
requirements. Under the Development Code, the Utelite facility 
would be considered a "structure" requiring a building permit. 
Development Code §§ 1.6(61) and 1.9. Factually, the County 
recognized that it was necessary for Utelite to secure a permit by 
belatedly requiring it to obtain a building permit. R. at 97; 3 56; 
2879. 
II. THE SUMMIT COUNTY DEVELOPMENT CODE AND UTAH LAW SUPPORT 
REMOVAL OF THE UTELITE FACILITY 
Appellants also erroneously claim that Appellees provided no 
legal basis for the remedy of removal. Appellees specifically 
cited sections of the Development Code, Utah statutory law and case 
law, all authorizing order of removal. Appellees' Brief at 22-24; 
Development Code § 1.16; U.C.A. § 17-27-23; Utah County v. Baxter, 
635 P. 2d 61, 65 (Utah 1981) (holding that a zoning violation is 
tantamount to irreparable harm) .7 As a matter of law, a use not 
7
 In an attempt to discount the applicability of U.C.A. § 17-
27-23, Appellants comment that this section was repealed in 1992. 
Reply Brief of Appellants at 15. This comment is of no worth 
because (1) this section existed during the relevant period 
involved in this case, and (2) the 1992 amendments contain a 
provision with similar language. The current "Enforcement" section 
17-27-1002 states that: 
(1)(a) A county, county attorney, or any owner of real 
estate within the county in which violations of this 
chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority of this 
chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to 
other remedies provided by law, institute: 
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any 
other appropriate actions; or 
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or 
remove the unlawful building, use, or act. 
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permitted in a specific zone is illegal and a court is fully 
authorized to order its removal. See U.C.A. §§ 17-27-23 (1987); 
17-27-1002 (1) (b) (1992); Development Code 1.16. 
Appellants' suggestion that it would be inequitable to remove 
an "expensive" facility cannot override this legal principle. The 
only justification for recognizing nonconforming structures at all 
is to protect a landowner's then existing investments in the 
property -- not expansions made after enactment of the restrictive 
ordinance.8 
(b) A county need only establish the violation to 
obtain the injunction. 
(2) (a) The county may enforce the ordinance by 
withholding building permits. 
(b) it is unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, 
alter, or change the use of any building or other 
structure within a county without approval of a building 
permit. 
(c) The county may not issue a building permit unless 
the plans of and for the proposed erection, construction, 
reconstruction, alteration, or use fully conform to all 
regulations then in effect. 
U.C.A. § 17-27-1002 (1992) (emphasis added). 
8
 See City and County of Denver v. Board of Adjustment, 505 
P.2d 44, 47 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972) (precluding construction of new 
nonconforming structures following the destruction of prior 
nonconforming structures); Clackamas County v. Portland City 
Temple, 511 P.2d 412 (Or.Ct.App. 1973) (affirming an injunction 
restraining defendants from using a portion of property zoned 
single family residential agricultural as an airport where the 
improvements were made after the enactment of the ordinance); 
Service Oil Co. v. Rhodus, 500 P.2d 807 (Colo. 1972) (holding that 
an owner of a service station that was destroyed by fire had 
abandoned the nonconforming use of the property since the owner 
made no attempt to obtain a permit to rebuild until after the 
abandonment period set forth in ordinance); see also 2 A. Rathkopf, 
The Law of Zoning and Planning, 61-1 stating: 
g:\jlw\echo\brief.a21 6 
This principle is even more clear under the facts of this 
case. Here, not only was there a zoning ordinance, but Judge 
Wilkinson ordered the facility be removed before most of the 
expenses were incurred. Summit County sought an interlocutory 
appeal and lost. Utelite was on notice that the facility could be 
removed and deliberately took the risk that it would be when it 
incurred further expenses. 
Finally, Appellants erroneously claim there must be a 
"specific" finding that the facility is not a "accessory use to the 
railroad's non-conforming use." There is no such requirement under 
Utah law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Mountain States, Etc. v. Atkin, 
Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984) (stating that " [f] indings 
of fact are unnecessary to support the granting of summary 
j udgment") .9 
III. SUMMIT COUNTY VIOLATED THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT BY NOT 
GIVING APPELLEES NOTICE 
Appellants convolute a straight forward violation of the Open 
and Public Meetings Act by arguing that the County's decision not 
[T] he constitutional protection afforded the owner of 
property on which a nonconforming use exists, exists only 
in order to permit the continuance of the use to the 
extent necessary to safeguard the investment of the 
property owner. 
Rathkopf at 61-1. 
9
 The Defendants cannot, and do not, state that Judge 
Wilkinson did not consider their argument. They made the same 
claim as the basis for their Opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and as the basis for their Motion to Dismiss. 
R. 161-179. Judge Wilkinson was not convinced, as is reflected in 
the Conclusions of Law, that the County did not meet the provisions 
of its Development Code. 
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to comply with the Act was "administrative" because it was made by 
a County staff member who simply chose to "confirm" it with the 
planning commission. This argument ignores the undisputed facts as 
proven by Utelite's own sworn responses to interrogatories. 
Utelite's answers establish that the decision finding this use to 
be "permitted" was made at a planning commission meeting with no 
notice to the public. See Utelite's Response to Plaintiffs' First 
Set of Interrogatories No. 27, Addendum A. 1 to Appellees' Opening 
Brief. 
Furthermore, there is no "administrative" exception to notice 
under the Open and Public Meetings Act. The terms of the statute 
and its announced public policy indicate actions taken by public 
bodies must be done in open with notice: 
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and 
declares that the state, its agencies and political 
subdivisions, exists to aid in the conduct of the 
people's business. It is the intent of the law that 
their actions be taken openly and that their 
deliberations be conducted openly. 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-2 (1977). Notice is a threshold procedural 
requirement for any action taken by the Planning Commission and 
there was no notice that the County Planning Commission would be 
making the decision to allow Utelite to locate its facility in Echo 
on property zoned rural-residential. R. 97, 129; Addendum A. 11, 
12 of Appellees' Opening Brief. 
Appellants' suggestion that complying with the Act would 
impose an "immense burden, if not near paralysis" on governmental 
g:\jlw\echo\brief.a21 8 
operations is without any evidentiary support.10 An equally 
persuasive argument is that true paralysis will occur if a public 
body in Utah must determine whether the decision it will make is 
"administrative" or "legislative" before it gives notice of its 
meetings.11 There are no standards or guidelines to follow, and 
the difficulty in making such a determination would be immense. It 
was never the intent of the Act to force this decision on the 
public body. Instead, the avowed intent of the Act is that there 
must be notice to assure action and deliberations are taken and 
conducted openly. Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-2. 
Finally, Appellants argue that the construction and operation 
of the facility itself was sufficient notice of a violation of the 
Open and Public Meetings Act to cause the running of a 90-day 
limitations period. However, as Appellants admit, the essentials 
of the Act are notice and minutes of meetings. When those are not 
10
 The consequences of complying with the Open and Public 
Meetings Act are not an "absurdity" as the Appellants would like 
this Court to think. It is the examples presented by the 
Appellants that are absurd. A closer analogy to the facts in this 
case would be that the homeowner in Appellants' example wished to 
construct a commercial loading facility in a subdivision zoned 
residential that had a railroad track running through it. Surely 
the Act intended that the planning commission would comply with its 
mandates in such a situation. 
11
 Defendants' argument is not in line with the mandates of 
the Open and Public Meetings Act. The Act applies to any "public 
body" not specifically exempted and defines the term "public body" 
to mean "any administrative, advisory, executive, or legislative 
body of the state or its political subdivisions." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 52-4-2(2). Thus, the Act does not distinguish between bodies 
that are performing an administrative or a legislative function. 
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provided, the essentials are hidden and the time limitations cannot 
begin. 
IV. BY VIOLATING THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 
CODE, SUMMIT COUNTY DEPRIVED APPELLEES OF DUE PROCESS 
Appellants argue that the Appellees have failed to establish 
(1) what process was due, and (2) how Appellees were deprived of 
this process. However, the Appellees cited to the Development Code 
and the Open Meetings Act, which both require notice. The Act 
further requires that minutes of meetings be kept. See Development 
Code § 6.3; U.C.A. §§ 52-4-6 and 52-4-7. There is also no 
distinction regarding notice requirements between "legislative" and 
"administrative" determinations.12 The mandates of the Development 
Code and Utah law establish, on their face, "what process is due," 
and Appellees showed their rights had been violated. 
Appellees established how they were deprived of this process 
through the undisputed facts. The facts in evidence showed that 
the agenda for the December 13, 1988 meeting of the Planning 
Commission provided no notice to the public that there would be a 
discussion concerning the proposed relocation and construction of 
the Utelite facility. R. 97; 129, see Addendum A. 11, 12 of 
Appellees' Opening Brief. Also, the minutes of the meeting were 
devoid of any reference to the Utelite facility. R. 124-127, 
Addendum A. 12 of Appellees' Opening Brief. 
12
 Section 52-4-6(2) requires that "each public body shall give 
not less than 24 hours' public notice of the agenda, date, time and 
place of each of its meetings, (emphasis added). 
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This evidence clearly established violations of law. Judge 
Wilkinson carefully considered this evidence and ruled that the 
actions of Summit County violated its Development Code and the Utah 
Open Meetings Act, and that these "acts and omissions have harmed 
Plaintiffs without providing them due process of law." R. 282-3. 
Thus, the trial court's finding was correct as a matter of law. 
V. APPELLEES ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988 
As a matter of law, the trial court erred in not awarding 
attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. In Lorenc v. 
Call, 789 P.2d 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals 
stated that "whether Plaintiff's complaint states a claim for 
relief under section 1983 is a question of law." Lorenc at 49 
(citations omitted). The Court quoted that: 
[t]o state a claim for relief under section 1983, a 
complainant need allege only (1) that some person 
deprived complainant of a right, privilege or immunity 
secured by the federal constitution; and (2) that such 
person acted under color of state law. 
Id. at 49-50 (citations omitted). Because the Plaintiff in Lorenc 
alleged a due process claim at the trial level, which she further 
developed on appeal, the Court concluded that she had stated a 
constitutional claim for relief under section 1983. Id. at 50. 
Although the Court did not reach the constitutional claim, the 
Court stated: 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently 
held that a Plaintiff is generally entitled to an award 
of attorney fees under section 1988 if the Plaintiff 
prevails on a statutory, non-civil-rights claim which is 
g:\jlw\echo\brief.a21 li 
pendant to a substantial constitutional claim and which 
arises from a "common nucleus of operative fact. 
Id. (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has 
reasoned that M[s]uch a fee award 'furthers the Congressional goal 
of encouraging suits to vindicate constitutional rights without 
undermining the longstanding judicial policy of avoiding 
unnecessary decision of important constitutional issues.'" Maher 
v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 135, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2577, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 
(1980) . 
Despite Appellants' argument, it is clear that the Appellees 
did allege a violation of due process claim in their original 
Complaint, in their Amended Complaint, and in their Second Amended 
Complaint. Appellees have further developed their constitutional 
claims in this appeal. In addition, Appellees prevailed on the 
pendent statutory Open and Public Meetings Act claim arising from 
the "common nucleus of operative fact" that they were deprived of 
notice. Therefore, as recognized by this Court in Lorenc and the 
United States Supreme Court, Appellees are entitled to attorneys 
fees under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1988. 
VI. THE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD WAS NOT A NECESSARY AND 
INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THIS LITIGATION 
The trial court was correct in ruling that the Union Pacific 
Railroad ("Railroad") was not a necessary and indispensable party. 
Appellants fail to analyze Rule 19 (a) or cite to a single case that 
does so. Under Rule 19(a) an absent entity is "necessary" and 
shall be joined only where: 
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(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded 
among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) 
as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to 
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons 
already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of his claimed interest. 
U.R.C.P. 19(a) (emphasis added). The trial court's determination 
must not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of discretion. 
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
aff'd. sub nom., Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 
1990). 
Judge Wilkinson did not abuse his discretion. Appellees' 
Prayer for Relief requested that the Utelite facility be removed 
for violating zoning requirements under the Summit County 
Development Code. Complete relief, removal of the facility, could 
be obtained without the Railroad and Appellants have never said 
otherwise. 
On the other hand, Appellants recognizing that complete relief 
would be afforded, challenged the trial court's decision by 
asserting that "the Railroad has a direct interest in the outcome 
of the litigation." Appellants' Reply at 13. This blanket 
argument ignores Rule 19(a) (2) . Rule 19(a) (2) is conjunctive. The 
entity must "claim an interest" and be so situated that disposition 
of the action in its absence would impede its ability to protect 
that interest. U.R.C.P. 19(a) (2) (i) . At no time has the Railroad 
"claimed an interest" as required by Rule 19(a) (2) . Its refusal to 
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do so is a factor upon which the trial court could rely in 
determining that it was not an indispensable party. See Moore' s § 
19.07[2.-1] at pp. 19-104 - 19-105 (citing United States v. Sabine 
Shell, Inc., 674 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that failure to 
join property owners did not require reversal where they had not 
attempted to intervene) [other citations omitted]). 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER PROHIBITING ALL DISCOVERY FROM 
SUMMIT COUNTY WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting further 
discovery against Summit County.13 Under Rule 26(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, any party is entitled to obtain discovery 
from any other party regarding any matter in the pending action, 
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking 
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including 
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and 
location of any persons having knowledge of any discoverable 
matter. 
In their Brief, Appellants argue that the discovery sought by 
Appellees against Summit County involved the very same factual and 
legal issues covered in the Partial Summary Judgment. However, the 
fact that Partial Summary Judgment was entered against Summit 
County requiring it to move the facility did not mean it lacked 
13
 After Appellees filed their Second Amended Complaint, the 
trial court entered a blanket protective order prohibiting all 
discovery against Summit County. R. at 775. 
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relevant and discoverable information to remaining claims against 
it and Utelite.14 
For instance, Appellees had pending attorney's fees claims 
which were in dispute against Summit County and had newly 
discovered information learned through informal discovery that 
Summit County was taking action to abandon the roadway upon which 
Utelite was located in violation of the law. The trial court's 
order prohibited the formal discovery necessary to pursue that 
issue. 
Appellees also had pending claims against Utelite, the owner 
and operator of the facility, for nuisance, trespass, and 
negligence. As a defense to these claims, before and during 
trial, Utelite argued that its conduct in building and operating 
the facility was reasonable because, among other things, Summit 
County approved the facility and properly issued building permits. 
Utelite's Answers to Interrogatories; R. 2840 and 2845. By 
prohibiting discovery, Appellees could not prepare for these 
defenses .15 
14
 Summit County possessed relevant information regarding the 
identity of witnesses and documents to be used at trial, its 
involvement in the location and operation of the facility, and the 
representatives of Summit County who Utelite would call as 
witnesses. Furthermore, Summit County continued to participate in 
the depositions of Appellees. 
15
 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Summit County's 
Motion for a Protective Order and Request for Oral Argument for 
Plaintiffs' argument on the relationship of each Request to the 
pending claims. R. at 725-31. 
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VIII. THE CONDUCT ALLEGED IN APPELLEES' NUISANCE 
CLAIM WAS SUBJECT TO STATUTORY PROHIBITION 
UNDER THE SUMMIT COUNTY DEVELOPMENT CODE AND 
UTAH LAW 
Appellants continue to claim that the trial court erred when 
it found that the conduct engaged in by Utelite was not subject to 
a specific statutory prohibition. The trial court did not make 
this decision lightly. It carefully examined the conduct, the 
Summit County Development Code and the cases upon which Utelite 
relies. As set forth in Appellees' Opening Brief, loading rock 
aggregate is a prohibited use under the Summit County Development 
Code §§ 12.7 and 12.20. These sections are specifically 
incorporated into Utah law. Utah Code §§ 17-27-7, 8 and 23.16 A 
violation like this is punishable as a criminal violation under the 
Development Code and the Utah Code. Thus, the argument that the 
conduct is not prohibited by the law is erroneous. Because it was 
prohibited, and still is, the facility is a nuisance per se. 
Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 943 (Utah 1990); Branch v. 
Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982). 
16
 Appellants note parenthetically that § 17-27-8 and 23 were 
repealed in 1992. A careful examination indicates that the entire 
zoning code was repealed and replaced in 1992. However, the 
replacement laws include Code sections that have provisions similar 
to §§ 17-27-7, -8, and -23 that were in full force when the 
facility was built. See e.g. Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-302, 305, 
1002. 
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IX. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN PROHIBITING APPELLEES 
FROM FILING AN AMENDED COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO THE 
EVIDENCE AND NOT PERMITTING EVIDENCE REGARDING ACCESS AND 
THE PUBLIC ROAD 
The trial court erred when it prohibited the Appellees from 
filing an amended complaint to conform to the evidence. Appellants 
incorrectly argue that a trial court has complete discretion in 
determining whether to allow amendment of a pleading, and that this 
Court should not reverse the trial court's decision absent an abuse 
of discretion. Appellants' Joint Reply at 16. Further, Appellants 
attempt to paint the picture that the amendment would cause great 
delay and result in substantial prejudice. This analysis is 
flawed. 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is liberally 
applied. The Rule permits amendments "by leave of court" which 
"shall be freely given when justice so requires." U.R.C.P. 15(a). 
The Rule allows "amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to 
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may 
be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment." 
U.R.C.P. 15(b) (emphasis added) .17 
In Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94 (Utah 1981), the Utah 
Supreme Court had occasion to analyze the liberal policy in Utah 
regarding amendment. The Court stated: 
17
 Rule 54(c) (1) furthers the liberal amendment mandates of 
Rule 15 by providing that "every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings." U.R.C.P. 54(c)(1). See Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 
91 (Utah 1963). 
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Ordinarily the allowance of an amendment by leave of 
court is a matter which lies within the sound discretion 
of the trial court. This discretion, however, is to be 
exercised in the furtherance of justice. The rule in 
this state has always been to allow amendments freely 
where justice requires, and especially is this true 
before trial. 
Lewis at 98 (allowing amendment where made before trial, the 
opposing party had adequate opportunity to meet the additional 
issue raised, and neither party was placed in a position of any 
greater advantage or disadvantage) (quoting Gillman v. Hansen, 486 
P. 2d 1045 (Utah 1971) (emphasis added) . According to the Lewis 
Court: 
A prime consideration in determining whether an amendment 
should be permitted is the adequacy of an opportunity for 
the opposing party to meet the newly raised matter. 
Lewis at 98. Further, according to Utah law, the stage of the 
proceedings in which Plaintiffs seek leave to amend is not the 
critical factor in determining whether leave should be granted. As 
clearly reasoned by the Utah Supreme Court: 
Some tempest has been raised about the court 
allowing the Plaintiff to make tardy amendments to the 
pleadings. In doing so, he [the trial judge] wisely and 
properly stated: "The pleadings are never more important 
than the cause that is before the court . . . . There 
can be no prejudice in this case because we'll give ample 
time for any answer . . . . " This is in harmony with 
what we regard as the correct policy: of recognizing the 
desirability of the pleadings setting forth definitely 
framed issues, but also of permitting amendment where the 
interest of justice so requires, and the adverse party is 
given a fair opportunity to meet it. 
Id. (quoting Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, 
Inc., 515 P.2d 446 (Utah 1973)). 
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Appellees sought leave to amend before a certificate of 
readiness for trial was filed by any party and no pre-trial 
conference or trial dates had been set. Amendment was required in 
order to plead their claim that Summit County was improperly 
abandoning the road and to add a new claim that the facility 
encroached upon a public road.18 The motion came at the time the 
Court had ordered for the conclusion of discovery --a time that is 
customary for such motions to be filed. Appellants had ample 
notice of these claims and adequate opportunity to meet these 
issues.19 In fact, two months after the motion was filed, Utelite 
itself supplemented its responses to discovery to name additional 
witnesses which led to several witnesses being identified and 
deposed. 
In derogation of Utah law, the trial court would not permit 
amendment. The court attempted to justify its decision by 
18
 In informal discovery Mr. Richins and his counsel learned 
for the first time that the road was a class "B" road for which 
Summit County had accepted public monies for maintenance. R. 659, 
690-91, 805. Legal research showed that there was a "sister" claim 
to nuisance known as encroachment on a public road. They also 
learned, two weeks before the end of the discovery period, that the 
Summit County Commission was taking steps to abandon the road 
without following statutory procedures. R. 690-91, 806. 
19
 After appeal to the Supreme Court was denied, Appellees 
filed a Second Amended Complaint to allege that the placement of 
the facility caused a nuisance. Utelite immediately served written 
discovery, and both Utelite and Summit County deposed the 
Plaintiffs. When asked about the basis for Mr. Richins and the 
Dicker Hill Trust nuisance claims, Mr. Richins testified that the 
facility blocked access to the property because it was built on a 
public road that served as the primary access to his home. R. 836-
38, 639-43, 688. 
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insisting that "the Plaintiffs can obtain the additional relief 
they seek by filing a new civil action in this court." R. 1028-29. 
This statement by the trial court defied logic. The parties were 
before the Court.20 The discovery had been done and the proposed 
claims arose out of a core of facts. See Wells v. Wells, 272 P.2d 
167, 170 (Utah 1954) (holding that amendments conforming to the 
evidence should be liberally allowed and that limitations thereon 
should be determined by whether the matters involved can be handled 
in one trial). 
Further, the trial court committed error by refusing to allow 
Mr. Richins to present evidence regarding access to his property. 
Appellants argue that there was not a specific allegation that 
placed access or the public road in issue. However, in their 
Second Amended Verified Complaint, Appellees alleged that Utelite 
was liable for the inconvenience, annoyance, discomfort, and other 
nuisance resulting from their placement of the facility. R. 312. 
In discovery, the access question was the focus of written 
discovery and depositions. R. 832, 836-38. Among other things, 
the proposed amendment was designed to more particularly describe 
how the lack of access was a nuisance. Thus, if there was any 
doubt about the pleading, notice was certainly imparted as to the 
20
 As stated above, removal of the facility, did not depend 
on the Railroad. The issues did not present a title question. 
Even if they did, Utelite could have easily presented any evidence 
it had to show it was justified in placing its facility where it 
did. Nothing would have prohibited it from doing so if the 
amendment was allowed. See argument VI. above. 
g:\jlw\echo\brief.a21 20 
claim, it was amply discovered, and amendment would have simply 
amplified it. 
Finally, the Appellants claim that the Appellees did not 
"proffer" the evidence they would have offered and that without the 
evidence this Court cannot determine whether the exclusion of the 
evidence offered affected the trial. Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 
147 (Utah 1987); Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) . The law in Utah is quite clear. If a trial court 
is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue, it is preserved. 
Onyeabor, 787 P. 2d 525. Under this standard, the issue was 
certainly preserved when the trial court denied the motion to 
amend. See Handy v. Handy, 776 P.2d 917, 924 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(quoting State v. One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am., 771 P.2d. 682, 684 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The trial court abused its discretion by denying the Motion to 
Amend and refusing to allow Appellees to plead and present evidence 
regarding access. The Appellees should be entitled to present 
these claims should this case be reversed because they are 
important to damages and further equitable relief. 
X. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO 
VIEW THE FACILITY IN OPERATION. 
Appellants' seek to justify the trial court's decision 
allowing the jury to see a staged operation of the facility by 
arguing that Appellees were seeking future damages. Indeed, the 
trial court indicated that the basis for its ruling was that it 
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would be "probative on the issue of current damages . . . [and] 
present lost property values." R. at 2664-65. 
In direct contrast to this, however, the trial court only 
permitted a claim for past damages when the case went to the jury. 
R. 1988-90. The trial court also advised the jury that there was 
an order to remove the facility. R. 1985-86. Thus, the court's 
rational for allowing the jury view because the Appellees were 
seeking more than "past damages" was completely undercut when the 
court restricted damages to the date of trial and told the jury 
that the facility would be removed. 
Moreover, the Appellants' argument that the trial court told 
the jury that the view would only depict how the facility operated 
on the day of the view underscores the problem of allowing the jury 
to view the facility at. all. As noted in Appellees' Opening Brief, 
the jury saw a make-believe demonstration and did not witness 
Utelite's typical operating conditions21. Utelite had moved just 
one car into place for loading, and did not clean the car by 
banging it and opening the doors. All of the debris typically 
surrounding the facility had been cleaned up. Because the view was 
21
 In their brief the Appellants claim Utelite "offered 
evidence from various witnesses that the condition observed at the 
Facility on September 14, 1995 was typical." One of these 
"witnesses," Wilda Peterson, a waitress at the Kozy Kafe, was not 
even present the day of the jury view. R. at 2927. Another could 
not recall if he had ever seen the facility operate. R. at 2797. 
Robert Swenson did not even know whether the facility was operating 
when he had seen it. R. at 2956. Finally, Brett Atkinson, a 
Utelite truck driver, said that generally all four drivers were not 
there to help each other get through the operation. R. at 2921. 
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not representative, it should not have been permitted. See State 
v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408 (Utah 1993) (upholding a trial court's 
denial of a motion to view a crime scene where it was unlikely that 
the site would be in the same condition as it was three months 
earlier); see also State ex rel. Road Commission, 449 P.2d 114 
(Utah 196 9) (finding an abuse of discretion where, in a takings 
case involving property valuation, the jury was permitted to view 
certain structures a considerable time after the taking and changes 
had occurred as to render the view of no assistance to the jury). 
XI. THE TRIAL COURTS DETERMINATION THAT THE FACILITY IS NOT 
PRESENTLY A NUISANCE IS CLEAR ERROR 
In their Brief, Appellants do not address the primary problem 
with the trial court's belated determination that the Utelite 
facility, at the time of trial, was not a nuisance. As a result of 
erroneous evidentiary rulings Appellees were unable to, among other 
things, demonstrate that the facility constitutes an ongoing 
nuisance that adversely affects the Appellees' use or enjoyment of 
their property. Additionally, since the trial was on "damages," 
Appellees could not introduce evidence on the way the facility was 
located to support further equitable relief. 
Contrary to the Appellants' arguments, Appellees have set 
forth specific and detailed facts demonstrating the facility was a 
nuisance at the time of trial. Appellees' Opening Brief, Statement 
of Facts pages 15-20. Appellees also filed timely objections to 
the Findings and Conclusions prepared by Utelite's counsel. R. 
2198-2211. The record clearly shows that these findings of fact 
23 
g:\jlw\echo\brief.a21 
were contradicted by substantial evidence. Attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A" are the specific Findings of Fact and the substantial 
evidence, with record citations, showing that the Findings are 
clearly erroneous. 
XII. A NEW TRIAL FOR ALL DAMAGES MUST OCCUR IN THE EVENT OF 
REVERSAL 
The primary relief sought by Appellees was, and continues to 
be, to have the facility removed. Affirming the order of removal 
will finally end this case. Should this Court reverse, however, 
the issue of all damages suffered by the Appellees flowing from the 
placement and operation of the facility must be presented to a jury 
that has all of Appellees' claims and all of the facts before it. 
Any other result will support a jury verdict that was unfairly 
based upon two erroneous instructions. First, that damages could 
only be for past harms. Second, that the facility would be 
removed. There can be no doubt the jury's verdict was impacted by 
these instructions. 
Appellants mistakenly claim that Appellees had the full 
opportunity to present evidence of damages and Utelite's conduct 
that meriting punitive damages. The history of this case belies 
such a claim. As set out above, Appellees were not allowed to 
engage in key discovery or to put all of their claims and evidence 
before the jury. Should there be a reversal, the jury must have 
every claim with all supporting evidence before it. 
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CONCLUSION 
The only way that Summit County's zoning ordinances are 
effective is if they are enforced. In this case that requires an 
affirmance of the order of removal. Appellees request the Court of 
Appeals affirm the trial court's order requiring Summit County to 
remove the Utelite facility so that the Summit County Development 
Code and the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act are honored and this 
case ends. 
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EXHIBIT A 
At the time Utelite filed its proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: Re Equitable Relief, the Plaintiffs objected. 
Since a record had not been prepared, they could not provide 
specific record citations. This Exhibit follows the objections 
with record citations. 
FACT 1: The Defendant Utelite Corporation ("Utelite") operates a 
loading facility (the "Facility") adjacent to the Union Pacific 
railroad tracks at Echo, Utah. 
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE: The statement that the facility is 
"adjacent" to the Union Pacific railroad track is misleading and 
incomplete. The uncontested facts, as demonstrated by the 
evidence, show: (1) Utelite located its facility in an area zoned 
as Rural Residential 2 (R. at 2383-84); (2) Utelite located its 
facility above the culinary water line that serves the residents of 
Echo, Utah, which impedes access to the line (R. 2569-70) ; (3) 
Utelite located its facility on the road that Richard and Ruth 
Richins traditionally used which causes inconvenience (R. 2642, 
2672); and (4) Utelite located its facility on and then moved the 
Echo Ditch that serves agricultural users without permission (R. 
2679-80). 
FACT 2: The Plaintiffs own property in the vicinity of the 
Facility. The Union Pacific railroad tracks that run through Echo, 
Utah lie between the Facility and the property owned by Jane 
Harper, Richard D. Harper and Frank Cattelan. Trains go through 
Echo, Utah on these tracks in excess of fifteen to twenty times per 
day. 
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE: The term "in the vicinity" is vague and 
ambiguous. The Plaintiffs Jane and Richard Harper own property 
that is directly across from the facility. (R. 2387). Plaintiff 
Frank Cattelan owns property that is contiguous to the Harpers. 
(R. 2556) . The Dicker Hill Trust owns property that is close to 
the Utelite facility and that has been primarily served by the road 
upon which Utelite built its facility. (R. 2650-55; 2668; 2690). 
FACT 3: At the Facility on a weekly basis, Utelite loads an 
average of six and one-half railroad cars with its kiln dried 
aggregate products. 
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE: This Finding is vague, misleading and does 
not accurately reflect the admitted evidence. The admitted 
evidence indicated that Utelite would load on some days and not 
others and there was no way for the Plaintiffs to know when loading 
would occur. (R. 24 02). The evidence further showed there were 
days when Utelite would load all day and into the evening. (R. 
2402). A log, admitted as Exhibits 19 and 20 at trial, documents 
Utelite's loading from the time the trucks began to arrive to the 
time they leave and the number of cars loaded. This log indicates 
that, on average, more than six and one-half rail cars were loaded 
per week. (R. 2588-89). 
FACT 4: Semi-trucks transport the aggregate product to the 
Facility for loading. It takes four trucks approximately forty 
minutes to load a single railroad car. 
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CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE: The Finding is misleading and does not 
accurately reflect the admitted evidence. In particular, the 
statement that "it takes four trucks approximately forty minutes to 
load a single rail car" implies a rail car is loaded in forty 
minutes. The evidence was that the loading occurs as trucks come 
to the facility. At times only one truck will be used to load a 
rail car. This means the loading of one rail car will occur over 
several hours. (Exhibits 19 and 20 at trial). In addition, the 
procedure for loading takes time. Truck drivers must move rail 
cars into place. At times, the rail cars sit at the site while 
partially loaded. (R. 2383). 
FACT 5: The Utelite Facility currently operates, with occasional 
exceptions, on weekdays during daylight hours. 
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE: "Occasional exceptions" is not defined and 
the evidence showed that Utelite had just before trial loaded as 
late as 10:00 p.m. (R. 2595; 2858; Exhibits 19 and 20 at trial). 
FACT 6: To deal with dust from the loading operations, Utelite 
has taken the following steps: 
a. Construction of a metal enclosure at the Facility. 
b. Installation of a bag house and duct work at the 
Facility. 
c. Paving of the access road to the Facility. 
d. Installation of curtains and an electric door at 
the Facility. 
e. Watering down aggregate at the Utelite plant. 
f • Installation of a hood and metal coverings over the 
conveyor belt and drop areas at the Facility. 
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g. Response to resident complaints called in to the 
Utelite plant including termination of loading on 
windy days. 
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE: Steps taken by Utelite to control 
aggregate should not be the basis for denying equitable relief 
unless their continued implementation, maintenance and/or existence 
actually preclude Utelite aggregate from migrating to Plaintiffs' 
properties so that Plaintiffs' health is not harmed, the Plaintiffs 
are not inconvenienced and the Plaintiffs can peacefully enjoy 
their property. Most of the witnesses testified that dust still 
migrates and continues to cause health symptoms like wheezing, 
coughing and running eyes. The migrating aggregate also causes 
inconvenience. (R. 2387-94; 2586; 2654; 2690-91; 2695-97) . Recent 
pictures were admitted showing Utelite aggregate in the bedroom of 
Mr. and Mrs. Harper's son as a result of it blowing from the 
facility. (R. 2394; Exhibit 14 at trial). Samples collected from 
the windows of the Harper home showed Utelite aggregate on the 
windows. (R. 2772; Exhibits 78, 79, 80, 84, and 85 at trial). 
This migration of lightweight aggregate occurred up to the date of 
trial. (R. 2395-98; 2654; 2579-86).x 
The substantial evidence does not support the following 
lettered paragraphs: 
Subparagraph 6 (a) . The term "metal enclosure" is misleading. 
Utelite constructed a chain link fence that does not "enclose" the 
facility to prohibit dust, and is much lower than the conveyor from 
1
 The Jury did not find that general damages had stopped 
because of the Utelite changes. The Jury was instructed that it 
could not award damages past the day of trial and that the court 
had ordered the facility to be removed. There is nothing in the 
Jury verdict that the annoyance, inconvenience, health hazards and 
degraded enjoyment of property have ended. 
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which aggregate migrates. (R. 2855-56; 2500). Aggregate is left 
on the road and railroad tracks. (R. 2501; 2579; 2742-45; 2906; 
2948). This aggregate migrates to Plaintiffs' properties. (R. 
2579-86; 2654) . The chain link fence does not "enclose" this 
aggregate at all or the aggregate that comes from the conveyor. 
(R. 2500) . Additionally, the fence is frequently left open and 
must be open at the time Utelite loads its aggregate. (R. 2500; 
2745). 
Subparagraph 6 (b). The "baghouse" only collects dust from 
the conveyor system, not the entire facility. The blowing 
aggregate occurs during dumping and when aggregate is left on the 
roadway and facility, even when Utelite is not loading. (See 
Subparagraph (a), supra). 
Subparagraph 6 (c) . Utelite leaves deposits of its aggregate 
on the paved road which migrates to Plaintiffs' property on windy 
days. (See Subparagraph (a) , supra) . Thus, the paving of the road 
does not preclude blowing aggregate. (id.) Utelite violates its 
air quality permit by leaving aggregate. (R. 2729-30). Utelite 
only cleaned up the aggregate from the road and rail tracks just 
before the trial. (R. 2674-76; 2906). 
Subparagraph 6 (d) . The curtains "installed" on the facility 
have been ripped and torn for a number of years and did not 
prohibit blowing aggregate. (R. 2504; 2905). The "electric door" 
at the facility is "sometimes" used and is open for extended 
periods. (R. 2504; 2744-45). 
Subparagraph 6 (e) . There was no evidence of the degree that 
aggregate is watered down at the Utelite plant or the frequency 
that this is done. The migration of the aggregate demonstrates 
that this "watering" down does not work. (R. 2501; Subparagraph 
(a), supra). 
Subparagraph 6 (f). The installation of the hood and metal 
coverings has not stopped the migration of dust. (See Subparagraph 
(a), supra). 
Subparagraph 6 (g) . In opening argument, counsel for Utelite 
claimed there was one instance where truckers were advised by Kip 
Bigelow through electronic communications to shut down. (Argument 
of Eric Olson) . Mr. Bigelow's testimony indicated there was no way 
to communicate to the truckers while on location. (R. 3 010). 
Plaintiff Richard Harper testified that Utelite only quit on one 
occasion after it had finished loading. (R. 2531) . The only other 
evidence that Utelite quit loading was one instance that occurred 
shortly before trial when Richard Harper complained to the persons 
loading. (R. 2530-31; 2922). 
The claim that Utelite quit loading was rebutted by Utelite's 
own employees and agents. Utelite does not know when the wind is 
blowing in Echo. (R. 2871; 2739). In fact, the Utelite aggregate 
does blow on windy days. (R. 2501; 2579-86; 2653-54; 2675-77). 
FACT 7: To deal with noise problems from the operation of the 
Facility, Utelite has taken the following steps: 
a. Installation of a muffler on the bag house. 
b. Instruction to truckers not to bang railroad cars 
in connection with loading. 
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE: Steps taken by Utelite to deal with noise 
cannot be the basis for denying equitable relief unless they work 
and are continually implemented. The evidence showed that the 
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Utelite facility is still noisy because the moving of railroad cars 
causes squeaking and banging, because the opening of the lids on 
the railroad cars causes banging, because persons loading Utelite 
bang on rail cars to clean and open them despite instructions from 
Utelite, because the engine noise from semi-trucks can be heard at 
the Harpers7 home, because the engine noise from the baghouse (even 
with muffler) is still loud enough to be an annoyance, and because 
the railroad engines at night generate noise when they bring 
railroad cars to the facility and remove railroad cars. (R. 2406-
17) . 
Subparagraph 7 (a) . The evidence showed that the installation 
of a muffler on the bag house reduced the noise but it still 
precludes the Plaintiffs from the peaceful enjoyment of their 
property, particularly on days when the wind blows toward the 
Harpers. Plaintiffs Harpers cannot hear in their yard under 
certain conditions, and cannot play with their children in their 
yard. (R. 2386-2417; Exhibit 12 at trial). 
Subparagraph 7 (b) . The evidence showed that despite 
instructions from Utelite, the truckers continue to bang on the 
cars to load and clean them. (R. 2505; 2740; 2925). 
FACT 8: To deal with other annoyances, Utelite has: 
a. Removed outdoor lighting at the Facility. 
b. Terminated night loading. 
c. Instructed truck drivers to yield to other vehicles 
seeking access to the frontage road on the far side 
of Interstate 84 through the road at the Facility. 
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE: Steps taken by Utelite to deal with other 
annoyances cannot be the basis for denying equitable relief if the 
conditions causing the nuisance continue. Plaintiffs specifically 
object to the lettered portions of paragraph 8 as follows: 
Subparagraph 8 (b) . The evidence showed continued to load in 
the evenings up to 9:00 p.m. (R. 2595; 2858; Exhibits 19 and 20 at 
trial). 
Subparagraph 8 (c) . There was evidence introduced to support 
that Utelite has instructed drivers to so yield. 
FACT 9: As a result of the actions taken by Utelite, confirmed by 
the Court's visit to the Facility while in operation and the 
Court's and third-party's review of videos, tapes and photographs 
of the Facility in operation, the Facility at present (a) is not 
injurious to the Plaintiffs, (b) does not adversely affect the 
Plaintiff's use and enjoyment of their property, and (c) does not 
cause any property damage to the Plaintiffs. 
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE: The evidence showed that the facility 
continues to cause injuries and inconvenience and lessens the 
enjoyment of Plaintiffs' property in the following ways: 
a. Jane Harper and her children have and continue to 
suffer from breathing problems caused by the aggregate (R. 
2386-2417); 
b. Jane Harper and Richard Harper's house is still 
affected by migrating dust. They must clean more often, the 
dust gets into their children's bedrooms and on their home's 
windows (R. 2386-2417; Exhibits 12, 13, 14 at trial); 
c. Jane and Richard Harper cannot eat vegetables from 
their garden without taking precautionary measures because of 
the aggregate that migrates to their vegetable garden (R. 
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2386-2417); 
d. Jane Harper cannot sleep in the day because of noise 
generated from the Utelite facility (R. 2386-2417; Exhibit 12 
at trial); 
e. Richard and Jane Harper are awakened at night 
because of noise caused by the railroad moving rail cars used 
to transport the Utelite aggregate (R. 2386-2417); 
f. Frank Cattelan has and continues to suffer from 
breathing problems caused by the aggregate; 
g. Frank Cattelan's cafe and house are still affected 
by migrating dust. He must clean more often as a result of 
the aggregate (R. 2586); 
h. Ruth and Richard Richins must now cross a very 
dangerous rail crossing and cannot move some farm equipment on 
the road they have traditionally used (R. 2653; 2689); and 
i. Richard Richins must now clean an irrigation ditch 
that was moved by Utelite without permission (R. 2687-88). 
